For over a decade the Supreme Court has grappled inconclusively with constitutional challenges to voluntary race-conscious affirmative action.
In December of 1865 General Howard, the Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, submitted to Congress a report describing the activities of the Bureau under the new statute. 38 The report revealed that in practice most of the Bureau's programs applied only to freedmen. Freedmen were the only beneficiaries of programs such as education, 39 labor regulation, 40 Bureau farms, land distribution, adjustments of real estate disputes, 41 supervision of the civil and criminal justice systems through the freedmen's courts, 42 registration of marriages, 43 and aid to orphans. 44 Both freedmen and refugees received medical assistance, but not in equal numbers: as of October 30, 1865, there were 6,645 freedmen under treatment, but only 238 refugees. 45 Moreover, freedmen received about three quarters of all rations distributed. Only in the area of transportation were the benefits to freedmen and refugees approximately equal, but this represented less than one percent of the Bureau's budget and was a function that Howard's report described as 'nearly ceased.' 46 Finally, General Howard, in urging Congress to improve the educational opportunities available to the poor, 47 *762 presented recommendations focusing almost entirely on the needs of freedmen.
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C. The 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act
After consulting at length with General Howard, 49 Senator Trumbull introduced a new Freedmen's Bureau bill, S. 60, 50 as a companion to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 51 S. 60 proposed to continue the operations of the Bureau 'until otherwise provided by law,' and to extend the Bureau's jurisdiction to refugees and freedmen 'in all parts of the United States.' 52 The bill contemplated an extensive administrative apparatus, with agents, if necessary, in every county. The bill authorized Congress to appropriate funds for the purchase of school buildings for refugees and freedmen. It also empowered the President to reserve up to three million acres of 'good' public land, to be rented and ultimately sold to freedmen and refugees in parcels not exceeding forty acres. Blacks occupying certain lands south of Savannah were assured possession for another three years and the Commissioner was authorized to provide them with other property thereafter. The bill prohibited discrimination against freedmen or refugees in the administration of the criminal or civil law in terms similar to the 1866 Civil Rights Act, except that violations were to be tried before agents of the Bureau under rules and regulations issued by the War Department.
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*763 Objections to the 1866 bill were similar to those advanced earlier, but the arguments against special treatment for blacks were more fully developed. Although S. 60 made no significant racial distinctions on its face, opponents and supporters generally viewed it as largely, if not exclusively, for the assistance of freedmen. Congressmen Taylor and Ritter, opposing the bill, contended that there were no longer any refugees for the Bureau to assist. Taylor explained that 'the great change wrought by the termination of the war . . . leaves the name of refugee without a meaning' and therefore that S. 60 was 'solely and entirely for the freedmen.' 54 Similarly, Representative Chanler reviewed the Bureau's report 55 in detail to demonstrate the paucity of assistance to refugees: 'This present bill is to secure the protection of government to the blacks exclusively, notwithstanding the apparent liberality of the measure to all colors and classes. . . . General Howard's report establishes the fact that the present bureau gave most of its aid exclusively to the negro freedmen.' 56 Most opponents of the 1866 bill complained, in the words of Senator Willey, that it made 'a distinction on account of color between the two races.' 57 Congressman Taylor most forcefully expressed this argument, in language that bears an uncanny resemblance to modern objections to affirmative action programs:
This, sir, is what I call class legislation-legislation for a particular class of the blacks to the exclusion of all whites . . ..
Such partial legislation, Mr. Speaker, cannot be lasting; it seems to me to be in opposition to the plain spirit pervading nearly every section of the Constitution that congressional legislation should in *764 its operation affect all alike.
No special and discriminating legislation that I am aware of has yet in this Republic stood the test of time, nor do I believe that it ought or will; and I warn the gentlemen in their zeal to elevate and ameliorate the condition of the freedmen not to allow this bill to pass regardless of the great principle, equality before the law, about which so much has been said during the past four years.
. . . .
It is said that it is a characteristic of zealots and fanatics to carry things to extremes. Many persons in our community have been proclaiming equality before the law so long, taking their text from the institution of slavery, that now there is an opportunity to establish so desirable a principle in our Government, that perhaps it would be well to stop and consider whether or not by passing this bill in its present shape we shall not overleap the mark and land on the other side, and before we are aware of it, not have the freedmen equal before the law, but superior. 58 Similarly, Senator McDougall, who believed in the superiority of the white race, objected that '[t]his bill undertakes to make the negro in some respects their superior . . . and gives them favors the poor white boy in the North cannot yet.' 59 Congressmen Marshall and Ritter contended the bill would result in two separate governments, 'one government for one race and another for another.' 60 Several members of Congress renewed the objection advanced without success in 1864 that the bill would result in whites being taxed to assist blacks. 61 Representative Ritter asked, 'Will the white people who have to support the Government ever get done paying taxes to support the negroes?' 62 Others argued that the bill would actually harm blacks either by increasing their dependence 63 or by provoking white resentment. 64 A number *765 of speakers thought the measure a device 'to practice injustice and oppression upon the white people of the late slave-holding States for the benefit of the free negroes. . . .'
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Opponents singled out various sections of the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau bill for special criticism. Senator Saulsbury objected in particular to the lands provision, complaining that '[n]o land is to be provided for the poor white men of this country, not even poor land; but when it comes to the negro race three million acres must be set apart, and it must be 'good land' at that.'
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Senator Hendricks was less concerned about setting aside lands in southern states, but found it 'very objectionable' to reserve such property for blacks in the midwest where 'white settlers are most crowding at this time.'
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Critics of the bill also focused on the Bureau's legal machinery. Senator Guthrie complained that the litigation Bureau agents were authorized to adjudicate was solely for the protection of the freedmen: 'All the suits to be instituted under this bill are to be those in which justice shall be administered in favor of the blacks; and there is not a solitary provision in it relative to suits in cases where the blacks do wrong to the whites.' 68 The Bureau's educational programs were again criticized for excluding whites. Congressman Rousseau cited the example of several schools in Charleston that were established with the assistance of the Bureau for the education of colored children, while federal authorities forbade the opening of all-white public schools. 69 In addition, Senator Johnson *766 urged:
If there is an authority in the Constitution to provide for the black citizen, it cannot be because he is black; it must be because he is a citizen; and that reason being equally applicable to the white man as to the black man, it would follow that we have the authority to clothe and educate and provide for all citizens of the United States who may need education and providing for. 70 The legislation before Congress, however, made no provision for educating white children, other than refugees, even on an integrated basis.
Opponents of S. 60 also claimed that various white groups were as entitled to assistance as were blacks. Senator Hendricks emphasized the plight of the defeated white supporters of the Confederacy, 71 while Senator Stewart focused on the families of fallen Union soldiers. 72 Congressman Marshall argued that aid should be given instead to loyal white southerners whose property the Union army had seized or used. Congress had earlier rejected claims by loyal whites, insisting that the federal government lacked the funds necessary to provide compensation. Marshall observed that ' t hey happen, unfortunately, to be white men and white soldiers, and they may starve and die from want . . . but when money is wanted to feed and educate the negro I do not hear any complaints of the hardness of the times or of the scarcity of money. They ought not to be left to perish by the wayside in poverty and by starvation when the country so much needs their work. It is not their crime nor their fault that they are so miserable. From the beginning to the present time they have been robbed of their wages, to say nothing of the scourgings they have received. I think that the nation will be a great gainer by encouraging the policy of the Freedmen's Bureau, in the cultivation of its wild lands, in the increased wealth which industry brings and in the restoration of law and order in the insurgent States. 78 Congressman Donnelly urged that with such assistance the negro 'becomes perforce a property-holder and a law-maker, and he is interested with you in preserving the peace of the country.' 79 *768 Congressman Moulton distinguished the Bureau's assistance to blacks from unfair discrimination:
[Congressman Marshall] says the bill provides one law for one class of men, and another for another class. The very object of the bill is to break down the discrimination between whites and blacks . . .. Therefore I repeat that the true object of this bill is the amelioration of the condition of the colored people. 80 Congressman Phelps urged that the bill properly gave special assistance to blacks because they lacked the political influence of whites to advance their own interests:
The very discrimination it makes between 'destitute and suffering' negroes and destitute and suffering white paupers, proceeds upon the distinction that, in the omitted case, civil rights and immunities are already sufficiently protected by the possession of political power, the absence of which in the case provided for necessitates governmental protection. 81 Supporters emphasized that the Freedmen's Bureau was formed to assist blacks to better their own position, rather than merely to provide relief. Senator Trumbull, the 1866 bill's author and Senate sponsor, explained that the legislation was intended 'to educate, improve, enlighten, and Christianize the negro; to make him an independent man; to teach him to think and to reason; to improve that principle which the great Author of all has implanted in every human breast . . ..' 82 Trumbull argued that ' w e shall not long have to support any of these blacks out of the public Treasury if we educate and furnish them land upon which they can make a living for themselves.' 83 Congressman Donnelly similarly stressed the importance of educating blacks not only for the blacks themselves but for 'the safety of the nation' as well. 84 As it had been in 1864, Congress in 1865 was divided on the existence of constitutional authority to enact the Freedmen's Bureau *769 legislation. Among other things, proponents of the bill relied on Congress' enforcement power under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment. 85 Senator Trumbull argued that 'under this provision of the Constitution we may destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional amendment amounts to nothing.' 86 In addition, supporters analogized the Bureau's activities and aid to Indians, which Congress had unquestioned authority to provide. 87 A substantial majority of the House and Senate, agreeing that the Freedmen's Bureau legislation was both constitutionally sound and urgently needed, passed the bill. 88 President Johnson, however, unexpectedly vetoed the bill. His lengthy veto message raised a variety of objections to the legislation, including doubts about its necessity, the risk of creating a permanent institution, and a desire that the states be left to address the problems that might exist. 89 The President saw both the adoption of social welfare programs by the federal government and the selection of one group for special treatment as unprecedented. Congress, he explained, has never founded schools for any class of our own people, not even for the orphans of those who have fallen in the defense of the Union, but has left the care of education to the much more competent and efficient control of the States, of communities, of private *770 associations, and of individuals. It has never deemed itself authorized to expend the public money for the rent or purchase of homes for the thousands, not to say millions, of the white race who are honestly toiling from day to day for their subsistence. A system for the support of indigent persons in the United States was never contemplated by the authors of the Constitution; nor can any good reason be advanced why, as a permanent establishment, it should be founded for one class or color of our people more than another. 90 He urged that Congress limit federal protection to whatever relief might be provided by the federal courts. 91 The Senate took up the Freedmen's Bureau bill the day after President Johnson's veto. Senator Trumbull responded to the arguments in the veto message paragraph by paragraph. To the President's contention that Congress had never before enacted class legislation, Trumbull responded:
[N]ever before in the history of this Government have nearly four million people been emancipated from the most abject and degrading slavery ever imposed upon human beings; never before has the occasion arisen when it was necessary to provide for such large numbers of people thrown upon the bounty of the Government, unprotected and unprovided for. . . .
[C]an we not provide for those among us who have been held in bondage all their lives, who have never been permitted to earn one dollar for themselves, who, by the great constitutional amendment declaring freedom throughout the land, have been discharged from bondage to their masters who had hitherto provided for their necessities in consideration of their services? 92 As he had done in previous debates, Trumbull asserted that the thirteenth amendment provided ample constitutional authority for the bill. 93 Despite Trumbull's efforts, and although the bill had earlier passed with better than a two-thirds majority in both houses, several supporters unexpectedly switched their positions *771 and the Senate vote was insufficient to override the veto. 94 Johnson's veto of the Freedmen's Bureau bill precipitated the final and irreparable break between the President and the Republican Congress. In the days immediately following the veto, Republican papers and leaders across the country attacked the President. 95 Johnson responded by denouncing the radical Republicans as traitors and disunionists, citing Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner and Wendell Phillips by name. 96 With that, Republican support for the President virtually disappeared. The In all our history, in all our experience as a people living under Federal and State law, no such system as that contemplated by the details of this bill has ever before been proposed or adopted. They establish for the security of the colored race safeguards which go infinitely beyond any that the General Government has ever provided for the white race. In fact, the distinction of race and color is by the bill made to operate in favor of the colored and against the white race. 97 Johnson complained in particular that the automatic citizenship conferred upon blacks entailed 'discrimination against large numbers of intelligent, worthy, and patriotic foreigners' who were still required to meet the statutory standards for naturalization. 98 He complained that the bill required federal courts, 'which sit only in one place for white citizens,' to move to any part of their district at the direction of the President to hear civil rights cases. 99 Unpersuaded by these arguments, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act over the President's veto.
Emboldened by the success of the Civil Rights Act, Congress again attempted to enact a Freedmen's Bureau bill. The House
Committee on Freedmen reported a new bill, H.R. 613, 100 which *772 omitted two provisions that had provoked particular criticism of S. 60 . H.R. 613 extended the Bureau for only two years, not indefinitely, and made no express provision for the appointment of agents for every county. 101 In addition, the reservation of a million or more acres of federal public lands for refugees and freedmen was deleted as unnecessary because the Southern Homestead Act, adopted after S. 60 was first proposed, had opened up federal lands in five southern states for settlement. 102 The new bill, however, contained four race-conscious provisions not included in the earlier proposal. First, section 1 of S. 60
would have extended the statute's coverage to 'refugees and freedmen in all parts of the United States.' 103 In contrast, section 1 of H.R. 613 limited coverage to all loyal refugees and freedmen, so far as the same shall be necessary to enable them as speedily as practicable to become selfsupporting citizens of the United States, and to aid them in making the freedom conferred by proclamation of the commanderin-chief, by emancipation under the laws of States, and by constitutional amendment, available to them and beneficial to the Republic. 104 Thus, although the Bureau was authorized to aid blacks in almost any manner related to their newly-won freedom, white refugees could be provided only that assistance necessary to make them self-supporting. Second, section 6 of S. 60 had authorized the construction of schools 'for refugees and freedmen dependent on the Government for support,' but H.R. 613 limited educational programs to blacks.
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*773 Third, although the general lands provision of S. 60 was deleted, H.R. 613 provided protection to blacks who had already occupied certain abandoned lands. 106 Moreover, Congressman Eliot contemplated that Bureau would use the Southern Homestead Act only 'to provide for the freedmen.' 107 Finally, sections 7 and 8 of the old bill, which had protected 'negroes, mullatoes, freedmen and refugees' from the discriminatory administration of civil and criminal law, were redrawn to prohibit only discrimination on the basis of 'race or color, or previous condition of slavery .' 108 In sum, although weakened in other respects, the new bill provided special aid and protection for blacks substantially more explicit than the vetoed bill or the 1865 Freedmen's Bureau Act.
Because Congress had exhaustively discussed S. 60 earlier in the year, the debates on H.R. 613 were brief. Nevertheless, the objection to the Freedmen's Bureau as special treatment for blacks, even more pertinent to H.R. 613, was renewed. Congressman LeBlond urged that it was 'the duty of this Congress to strike down that system at once, leaving these colored people, free as they are, to make a living in the same way that the poor whites of our country are doing.' 109 He opposed in particular the provision of H.R. 613 authorizing the Secretary of War 'to issue such medical stores or other supplies and transportation, and afford such medical or other aid' necessary to carry out the purposes of section 2 of the 1865 Freedmen's Bureau Act, that is, the assistance of 'destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen.' 110 *774 It is true it only purports upon its face to confer the power to furnish medical aid; yet the power is there given not only to feed but to clothe the colored people who have been slaves. That of itself is objectionable. It is class legislation; it is doing for that class of persons what you do not propose to do for the widows and orphans throughout the length and breadth of this whole country. 111 Congressman Eliot urged that special treatment for blacks was entirely proper. Referring to the lands provisions of H.R. 613, he argued:
We owe something to these freedmen, and this bill rightly administered, invaluable as it will be, will not balance the account. We have done nothing to them, as a race, but injury. They, as a people, have done nothing to us but bood. . . . We reduced the fathers to slavery, and the sons have periled life to keep us free. That is the way history will state the case. Now, then, we have struck off their chains. Shall we not help them to find homes?
They have not had homes yet.
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H.R. 613 easily passed the House, and the Senate later approved a similar draft. 113 President Johnson, however, again vetoed the bill, arguing that it fell 'within the reasons assigned' in his veto message concerning S. 60. 114 After claiming that any unique problems of blacks had already been resolved, Johnson criticized the lands sections for providing property only 'to a particular class of citizens.' 115 The new veto message closed with an emphasis on the undesirability of special treatment for any 'favored class of citizens': 'In conclusion I again urge upon Congress the danger of class legislation, so well calculated to keep the public mind in a *775 state of uncertain expectation, disquiet, and restlessness . . ..'
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President Johnson returned the bill to Congress and it was immediately voted on by both houses. Senator Saulsbury, who had opposed legislation for freedmen since the first proposals in 1864, once again questioned the bill's preferential treatment for blacks:
What is the principle involved? No less a principle than this: has the Congress of the United States the power to take under its charge a portion of the people, discriminating against all others, and put their hand in the public Treasury, take the public money, appropriate it to the support of this particular class of individuals, and tax all the rest of the people of the country for the support of this class? 117 Congress, which had consistently rejected such arguments, did so again. The House voted 104 to 33 to override the veto, and the Senate voted the bill into law by a margin of 33 to 12.
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D. 1867 Relief Legislation
In March of 1867 Congress adopted two statutes authorizing the federal government to furnish food and other aid to the poor. The contrasting provisions and legislative histories of these statutes indicate the care with which Congress acted when deciding whether to limit participation in federal programs on racial lines. The first measure appropriated funds 'for the relief of freedmen or destitute colored people in the District of Columbia, the same to be expended under the direction of the commissioner of the bureau of freedmen and refugees.' 119 Senator Morrill urged that 'the necessities of this class of people in this District . . .
commend themselves very strongly to the Senate's sense of humanity and charity.' 120 Congressman Holman argued for its adoption on the ground 'that great destitution exists among the colored population here, and that an appropriation of this kind is imperatively demanded by considerations of common humanity.' 121 The supporters of this legislation described the extreme poverty with which it *776 was concerned as a problem limited to blacks. The members of Congress who had earlier opposed the Freedmen's Bureau legislation neither challenged this description of the situation in the District of Columbia nor objected to the fact that the relief bill covered only blacks.
Two weeks later Congress enacted 'a Resolution for the Relief of the Destitute in the Southern and Southwestern States. ' The measure was adopted in response to a crop failure and resulting famine that imperiled whites as well as blacks; General Howard advised Congress, in a letter quoted by Senator Trumbull, that the number of destitute whites in the south exceeded the number of similarly desperate blacks. 122 The resolution enacted to remedy this situation authorized the Secretary of War, 'through the commissioner of the freedmen's bureau,' to provide from funds previously allocated to the Bureau 'supplies of food sufficient to prevent starvation and extreme want to any and all classes of destitute or helpless persons. . . .' 123 The decision to give indigent whites equal access to Bureau food supplies originally intended for freedmen provoked great controversy. Congressman Butler objected to this plan to aid 'the white men at the expense of freedmen.' He asked, rhetorically, for whom Congress should encroach 'upon the provision made for the freedmen,' and concluded that the food would benefit
[n]ot merely the women and the children, not merely the sick and the disabled, but the able-bodied rebel who, lounging at the corner grocery, refuses to work, while the 'mudsills' of the North are obliged to work in order that they may pay taxes for the support of the Government. 124 Others again criticized the general exclusion of whites from the Bureau's aid programs, 125 and urged Congress to extend other benefits to whites. 126 A number of speakers expressed the view, apparently well founded, that the Bureau had already begun to treat all *777 starving whites as 'refugees' because of their urgent need. 127 The sense of Congress was expressed by Congressman Bingham, the author of the fourteenth amendment, who saw no objection to the general racial limitation in the Freedmen's Bureau Act, 128 but argued that no such distinction should be made in the case of actual starvation:
Do not then, I pray you, ask that this Government shall degrade itself in the presence of the civilized world by refusing supplies to its own citizens who are famishing for bread, and stop to inquire of the starving thousands whether they were friends or enemies. Sir, you cannot discriminate, if you would, between friends and enemies when famishing men ask for bread. 129 The resolution's supporters argued mainly against the discrimination between loyal 'refugees' and rebels, rather than between blacks and whites. Nevertheless, their fundamental position was that in the face of a famine affecting southerners of all races and political persuasions, Congress should not give aid to any favored class at the expense of others. Congressman Boyer argued that simple humanity demanded assistance for 'our countrymen of all sections, parties, and complexions.' 130 He thus supported extension of the Bureau's aid programs to include 'starving men, women, and children, who are neither negroes nor refugees.
Since we have the Freedmen's Bureau, let us at least ingraft upon it this feature of universal instead of restricted humanity.'
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The different approaches taken in the two relief measures demonstrate that Congress was not indiscriminate in the creation of race-conscious programs. If, as in the District of Columbia, the particular problem was essentially limited to blacks, not even the conservative members of Congress objected to identifying by race *778 the beneficiaries of a federal program. On the other hand, if whites as well as blacks were in need of basic necessities such as food and clothing, even the Radical Republicans, who had supported the race-conscious provisions of the Freedmen's Bureau legislation, rejected distinctions made on the basis of race or any other characteristic.
E. Claims of Black Servicemen
During the Civil War Congress authorized special bounties and other payments for soldiers who enlisted in the Union forces, to be payable at the conclusion of hostilities or upon completion of the period of enlistment. In the years following the war unscrupulous claim agents, offering to represent black servicemen in obtaining sums owed to them, took advantage of their often uneducated and unsophisticated clients and pocketed unwarranted portions of the funds obtained. 132 To protect the black soldiers, Congress in 1866 established a schedule of maximum fees payable to agents or attorneys handling these claims. 133 When this measure proved inadequate, Senator Wilson proposed that the claims of black servicemen from southern states that were being handled by agents or attorneys be paid to the Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, who would then pay each claimant and agent or attorney the sum authroized by law. 134 Opponents criticized this proposal, like other legislation pertaining to the Freedmen's Bureau, as a form of discriminatory legislation. Senator Grimes said he had long maintained that class legislation was a great error, that it was wrong, that it was wicked; that we should not single out one class and say that the nation should take the guardianship of that class to the exclusion of another class; that we should not single out one class and confer upon them a consequence which we would not confer upon another class.
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*779 Congressman Holman saw no basis for treating blacks as less than self-sufficient in financial matters, if Congress believed them qualified to vote:
If, as you assert, the colored man is competent to control the affairs of the nation, I insist that all public laws and regulations which are made applicable to any class of our citizens who participate in controlling public affairs should be alike applicable to all who are invested with that high right; and that our laws should be sufficiently effective in their provisions to protect all men in their just rights of property. 136 Moreover, Senator Howe thought the bill covered too many blacks because it did not 'discriminate at all between . . . those who are educated and those who are not.'
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Proponents of the legislation based their arguments on the special needs of black servicemen. For example, Congressman Garfield pointed out that black soldiers and sailors, unlike their white counterparts, generally were not represented by state government agents from their home states. 138 Congressman Scofield argued similarly that conditions requiring special treatment for black servicemen resulted from past discrimination:
[W]e have passed laws for the protection of white soldiers, but not going quite as far as this, because, unlike the blacks, they have not been excluded from your schools by legal prohibition, nor have they all their lives been placed in a dependent position. I know the colored people are ignorant, but it is not their own fault, it is ours. We have passed laws that make it a crime for them to be taught and now, because they have not the learning that the white man has, gentlemen say we must not pass laws to protect them against plunder by the sharks that hang around the bounty offices.
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*780 Congress found these arguments for special treatment persuasive, and passed the bill by a substantial margin.
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F. Freedmen's Bureau Legislation, 1868-70
The 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act had extended the Bureau's operations until July, 1868. In his report of December 1867, General Howard noted that although the scope of other Bureau activities had gradually diminished, the operation of schools for freedmen had continued to expand. 141 Howard, initially believing that the reconstructed southern states would treat the freedmen fairly, recommended that Congress permit the Bureau to expire as planned, transferring its educational work to another agency and the payment of black servicemen's claims to the War Department. 142 When the Bureau began to withdraw its agents, however, Howard discovered that the consequence was 'to close up the schools; to intimidate Union men and colored people, and, in fact, to paralyze almost completely the work of education which, until then, was in a healthful condition and prospering.'
143 Accordingly, Howard recommended that Congress continue the Bureau for another year. 144 General Howard regarded education as the most important aspect of the Freedmen's Bureau's work. He explained that 'the most urgent want of the freedmen was a practical education; and from the first I have devoted more attention to this than to any other branch of my work.' 145 In most years more than two-thirds *781 of all funds expended by the Bureau were used for the education of freedmen. 146 In each of the years immediately prior and subsequent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Freedment's Bureau educated approximately 100,000 students, nearly all of them black. 147 Among black students no distinctions were made according to the degree of past disadvantage. Because comparable free public education was not generally available in the south during this period, the consensus among historians is that southern black children received a better education in these years than most white children. 148 The Bureau also provided funds, land, and other assistance to help establish more than a dozen colleges and universities for the education of black students. 149 In 1867, following the incorporation of Howard University, the Bureau provided the University with the down payment for its property and then constructed its buildings *782 at a cost of one-half million dollars. 150 Underlying the decision to assist the University was General Howard's view that, following the end of the war, 'Negro pharmacists and other medical men were soon required, and contentions with white men in the courts demanded friendly advocates at law.' 151 Although Howard University was open to all races, the Bureau required as a condition of its aid that the University make 'special provision for freedmen.'
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In 1868 Congressman Eliot introduced legislation to extend the life of the Bureau, emphasizing the importance of its educational work:
[I]f the protecting care of the General Government, feared by those whose hearts are rebel as their hands were hostile during the war, should be removed, there is no doubt at all that schools would be abolished and a war upon the freedmen be begun. . . . Schoolhouses are in some places rented and everywhere protected by the Government, and it is this protection which is needed, and without which they cannot be continued. 153 Extension of the Bureau was opposed on the same grounds as in past years. 154 Congress again rejected these arguments by a decisive margin 155 and in June, 1868 renewed the Bureau for another *783 year. 156 In Except for a single appropriation in 1866, the Bureau had been self-supporting, paying for its programs in part with funds received from the rental of abandoned property. With the termination of all but the education and colored servicemen programs, however, these sources of income were lost. After continuing on reserves for two years the Bureau ran out of funds in the spring of 1870. 159 The Bureau's insolvency forced Congress to consider General Howard's recommendation that federal funding for the operation of local educational facilities be continued on a permanent basis. In March of 1870, Congressman Arnell introduced legislation to create an Office of Education 'to exercise the same powers as those hitherto exercised by Freedmen's Bureau in its educational division.' 160 The measure passed the House 161 but never reached a vote in the Senate. 162 With the defeat of the Arnell bill the educational activities of the Bureau ended, and all too soon thereafter most of the freedmen's schools were closed. The Bureau, moribund except for the payment of black servicemen's claims, was finally abolished in 1872.
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*784 II. THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The race-conscious federal programs discussed in Part I are of decisive importance for the construction of the fourteenth amendment because they were enacted in the same era in which the amendment itself was framed. The thirty-ninth Congress, which adopted the fourteenth amendment, also enacted the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act, the most far-reaching, racially restricted and vigorously contested of those programs. The House passed the amendment on May 10, 1866, the Senate voted a modified version on June 8, and the House agreed to the Senate changes on June 13. 164 The House approved the Freedmen's Bureau Act on May 29, 1866, the Senate adopted a modified version on June 26, and the Conference Report was approved on July 2 and 3. 165 On several occasions the Act was debated in one house at the same time the amendment was being considered in the other. 166 The composition of the majority supporting the amendment was nearly identical to that which supported the Act. 167 The sponsors of the fourteenth amendment, Congressman Stevens and Senator Wade, as well as its author, Congressman Bingham, all voted for the Freedmen's Bureau Act. The sponsors of the Act, Senator Trumbull and Congressman Eliot, voted for the amendment. Indeed, Eliot spoke at length in support of the amendment, 168 and Trumbull wrote and sponsored the 1866 Civil Rights Act, whose substantive provisions *785 were the basis of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. 169 Congressman Stevens, introducing the fourteenth amendment in the House, characterized its basic purpose as 'the amelioration of the condition of the freedmen.' 170 These are nearly the same words Congressman Moulton used only three months before to describe the object of the Freedmen's Bureau bill. 171 Stevens' choice of language reflects the identity of purpose underlying the two measures. Congress, fully aware of the racial limitations in the Freedmen's Bureau programs, cannot have intended the amendment to forbid the adoption of such remedies by itself or the states. On the contrary, the supporters of the Act and the amendment regarded them as consistent and complementary, and opponents viewed the two, together with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as part of a single coherent policy. 172 No member of Congress hinted at any inconsistency between the fourteenth amendment and the Freedmen's Bureau Act. Indeed, while debating the amendment, opponents frequently went out of their way to criticize the Freedmen's Bureau, 173 while supporters of the amendment praised it. 174 There is, moreover, substantial evidence that Congress adopted the fourteenth amendment in part to provide a constitutional basis for the Freedmen's Bureau Act. 175 When President Johnson vetoed the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau bill, he questioned whether the Constitution permitted the measure and challenged in particular the *786 authority of Congress to spend funds, at least outside the District of Columbia, to aid any needy class. 176 At the time of the veto, Congress was already debating an early draft of the fourteenth amendment giving Congress enforcement authority similar to that now contained in section 5. 177 During debate on the draft Congressman Woodbridge, after reciting the need for federal aid to destitute freedmen, argued:
[It] may be said that all this may be done by legislation. I am rather inclined to think that the most of it may be so accomplished. But the experience of this Congress in that regard has been most unfortunate. Sir, I cast no imputation upon the President of the United States. . . . But inasmuch as the President, honestly, I have no doubt, has told us that there were constitutional difficulties in the way, I simply suggest that we submit the proposition to the people, that they may remove these objections by amending the instrument itself. 178 Later in that day's debate Congressman Bingham, the sponsor of the draft amendment, placed in the record a newspaper article describing the 'rejoicing by the people of the South' at news that 'the President had vetoed the Freedmen's Bureau bill.' 179 When opponents objected that the article was irrelevant to the debate on the proposed amendment, the Speaker ruled that it was pertinent:
This constitutional amendment proposes to give Congress 'power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.' And if the Chair is correctly informed by the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio as to what this extract is, it relates to the veto by the President of a bill passed by Congress in regard to the rights of certain persons, and if that is the case, it may be within the province of *787 Congress to pass a constitutional amendment to secure those rights and the rights of others generally, and therefore, as a part of the remarks of the gentlemen from Ohio, this is certainly in order. 180 In other words, the Speaker viewed the Freedmen's Bureau bill as an example of federal legislation securing equal protection, precisely the sort of legislation for which the fourteenth amendment would provide clear constitutional authority. Congress, or at least the Speaker of the House, regarded the race-concious assistance programs of the Freedmen's Bureau as furthering rather than violating the principle of equal protection.
Of course, the fourteenth amendment applied only to the states, and it was not until the twentieth century that the Supreme Court found an 'equal protection component' in the fifth amendment, applicable to the federal government. 181 But there is substantial evidence that the framers of the fourteenth amendment also believed that Congress was, and indeed always had been, bound by the principles that the amendment extended to the states. The terms of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also make clear that the race-conscious Reconstruction programs were consistent with the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection. Proponents of the fourteenth amendment repeatedly emphasized that one of its primary purposes was to place in the Constitution the principles of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act. 185 Unlike the fourteenth amendment, section 1 of the Act contains no state action requirement, and is thus enforceable against federal officials as well as private parties. 186 Therefore, if the Civil Rights Act had forbidden benign race-conscious programs, it would have virtually shut down the Freedmen's Bureau. For example, section 1 of the Act assured all persons the right to contract, but only blacks could contract for education by paying tuition to Bureau schools. 187 Because Congress could not have intended the Civil Rights Act to prohibit the Bureau's activities, the amendment that constitutionalized the Act should not be construed to invalidate other race-conscious programs.
*789 III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The contemporaneous creation of the race-conscious Freedmen's Bureau programs and the fourteenth amendment illuminates the amendment's meaning in several ways. First, the framers of the fourteenth amendment cannot have intended it to nullify remedial legislation of the sort Congress simultaneously adopted. Second, the debates concerning the Reconstruction programs provide clear examples of the kinds of reasons and circumstances that would justify the use of race-conscious remedies in the eyes of those who adopted the fourteenth amendment. Conversely, the arguments made unsuccessfully against those programs by legislators who also opposed the fourteenth amendment cannot represent the standards embodied in the amendment. Third, the particular contours of the Reconstruction measures-for example, the provision of basic necessities on a race-neutral basis -give some indication of the circumstances in which affirmative action would be constitutionally impermissible. This evidence demonstrates that some of the constitutional standards proposed over the last decade by members of the Supreme Court are inconsistent with the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court most recently addressed at length the constitutionality of affirmative action in Fullilove v. Klutznick. 188 upheld by a vote of six to three a provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 189 requiring that ten percent of all federal grants for local projects be channeled to minority firms. Each of the five separate opinions in Fullilove proposed a different constitutional standard.
Justice Stewart's dissent advanced the simplest standard, 190 For Justice Stewart all racial classifications by government are per se unconstitutional whether or not the classification is part of program to assist disadvantaged minorities:
Under our Constitution, the government may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of that person's race. . . . The rule cannot be any different when the persons injured by a racially biased law are not members of a racial minority. . . . From the perspective of a person detrimentally affected by a racially discriminatory *790 law, the arbitrariness and unfairness is entirely the same, whatever his skin color and whatever the law's purpose, be it purportedly 'for the promotion of the public good' or otherwise. 191 Justice Stewart would read into the fourteenth amendment an absolute prohibition against race-conscious programs, a rule that clearly would have invalidated the very programs that the framers of the amendment adopted in 1866 to assist the freedmen. The theory that benign racial classifications are indistinguishable from those adopted out of malice is precisely the absolutist view of 'class legislation' 192 articulated by the congressional minority that opposed both civilian Reconstruction and the fourteenth amendment. Justice Stewart expressly condemned the suggestion that correcting past discrimination, the repeatedly expressed purpose of the race-conscious Reconstruction programs, is sufficient justification for such programs. 193 Quoting from Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 194 Justice Stewart contended that ' p referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids ." 195 Conceding that the statute under review was enacted to compensate for past disadvantages, he insisted that ' n o race . . . has a monopoly on social, educational, or economic disadvantage, and any law that indulges in such a presumption clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.' 196 *791 These arguments echo the objections raised a century ago by opponents of the Freedmen's Bureau and rejected by the same Congress that enacted the fourteenth amendment. It is inconceivable that the majority of Congress, by approving the amendment, intended to condemn their most important domestic program or to embody in the Constitution the social theories of their opponents. The fourteenth amendment may have applied explicitly only to the states, but supporters of the amendment clearly believed that the principle of equality embodied in it was entirely consistent with the Freedmen's Bureau legislation.
Congress concluded that such race-conscious measures would not violate 'that great principle, equality before the law, about which so much' had been said in the years leading up to the amendment. 197 Justice Stevens' opinion in Fullilove set forth a different standard for holding the ten percent minority set-aside unconstitutional. He accepted in principle the idea that Congress could adopt race-conscious legislation to remedy previous acts of discrimination: 'Racial characteristics may serve to define a group of persons who have suffered a special wrong and who, therefore, are entitled to special reparations.' 198 Justice Stevens insisted, however, upon 'the most exact connection between justification and classification.' 199 Even the history of class-based discrimination against blacks in the United States could not justify 'a random distribution of benefits on racial lines,' necessitating some attempt 'either to measure the recovery by the wrong or to distribute that recovery within the injured class in an evenhanded way.' 200 Furthermore, a program must be 'narrowly tailored' to guarantee that no individual will receive any benefits without in fact being a victim of discrimination. 201 Justice Stevens applied these standards in Fullilove and found wanting the absolute precision suggested by the phrase 'exact connection.' He concluded that the set-aside program was defective *792 because it provided the same benefit to all victims of discrimination, rather than attempting to calculate the particular degree of assistance that each minority contractor required to neutralize the effects of past discrimination. 202 Justice Stevens candidly acknowledged in a footnote that such calculations were probably impossible. 203 He also objected that participation in the set-aside program was open to all minority-owned firms. 204 In his view the necessary 'exact connection' would exist only if Congress demonstrated that each assisted firm had been the victim of unfair treatment. 205 Justice Stevens did not explain, however, how such a determination could be made for each of the nation's 382,000 minority-owned firms.
206
A practicable affirmative action program that could meet Justice Stevens' extraordinarily stringent standard is difficult to imagine. None of the race-conscious Reconstruction programs could have passed the Stevens test. The programs applied to all blacks, not just to recently freed slaves or to blacks who had been denied an education because of their race. Indeed, the thirty-ninth Congress expressly rejected such limitations. 207 The amount of assistance extended under the Reconstruction programs, like the benefits of the set-aside program condemned by Justice Stevens, was not in any way adjusted to match the amount of harm that each individual had earlier suffered. During the 1860's only those members of Congress who opposed both Reconstruction and the fourteenth amendment ever suggest that the scope and nature of race-conscious *793 relief ought to match precisely the harm previously sustained by the individuals who were to benefit from the programs. 208 Those members of Congress who favored the programs and the amendment framed their arguments and their legislation in far broader terms than Justice Stevens now regards as acceptable, emphasizing the past harm to blacks as a group and providing relief that encompassed the entire race. Whether this approach was based on Congress' concept of social justice or its doubts about the feasibility of making an 'exact connection,' those who framed the fourteenth amendment deliberately rejected Justice Stevens' approach to remedying the effects of past discrimination.
Justice Powell asserted in Fullilove, as he had in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 209 that race-conscious programs adopted to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination are constitutional only if they meet three requirements: first, the entity that establishes the program must have the 'authority and capability' to make findings of past discrimination; 210 second, it must in fact make sufficient findings of relevant past discrimination; 211 and third, it must choose a 'permissible means' for redressing the identified past discrimination. 212 The first two criteria would have posed no apparent problem for the race-conscious Reconstruction programs, because Justice Powell regards Congress as preeminently qualified to make findings of discrimination, 213 and because the legislative history of the Reconstruction programs is replete with references to prior discrimination. 214 Whether those race-conscious programs could have satisfied Justice Powell's third requirement, however, is uncertain.
In assessing the permissibility of race-conscious means chosen to *794 correct past discrimination, Justice Powell suggested in Fullilove that a variety of factors should be considered, including the efficacy of alternative remedies, the planned duration of the remedy whether minorities receive more than their pro rata share under the program, the flexibility of the program, and the effect of the remedy on innocent whites. 215 Justice Powell voted for upholding the set-aside program, emphasizing that the required 10% level of minority participation was lower than the 17% of the population that is non-white, and that only 0.25% of the funds expended nationally for construction work each year was reserved under the set-aside program for minority contractors. 216 Despite Justice Powell's analysis, the imposition of any ceilings on the proportion of minority participation in a race-conscious remedial program clearly would be inconsistent with the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment-under the Reconstruction programs blacks typically received all of the benefits. For example, all of the participants in the Freedmen's Bureau's education program were black, and that program comprised all of the federal assistance to education. 217 The raceconscious Reconstruction measures were designed to assure not only prospective nondiscrimination, as the Fullilove set-aside program may have been, but also to provide compensatory treatment and benefits to redress past discrimination. Whether Justice Powell adheres to a comparably broad view of Congress' remedial authority is far from clear.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Fullilove rejected the arguments against the set-aside program without articulating any specific constitutional standard. Like Justice Powell, the Chief Justice accepted the propriety of congressional action to correct past racial discrimination, and noted that the use of racial criteria is often necessary to provide effective relief. 218 Responding to the petitioners' objection that the set-aside program burdened white-owned enterprises, the Chief Justice offered three arguments: first, such burdens are permissible in correcting past discrimination; second, the burden imposed in Fullilove was 'relatively light'; and third, nonminority firms may well have benefitted in the past from the *795 exclusion of minority businesses.
219
The opinion, however, did not elaborate on the comparative importance of these three factors or on the constitutionality of a program that placed a relatively heavy burden on whites. The Chief Justice also rejected the criticism that the set-aside program might in some instances benefit a minority-owned firm that had not been injured by past discrimination, asserting somewhat vaguely that a race-conscious program must provide 'a reasonable assurance that application of racial or ethnic criteria will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives.' 220 Although this requirement is less stringent than Justice Stevens' approach, 221 it is unclear whether the race-conscious Reconstruction programs could meet even the Chief Justice's standard. need not withstand the kind of strict scrutiny Justice Powell would apply. 224 The second and third criteria are well-designed to separate 'invidious' discrimination from the 'ameliorative' race-conscious programs that the thirty-ninth Congress believed were not only constitutional but also sound policy.
The framers of the fourteenth amendment, although considerably *796 more enthusiastic about affirmative action than many members of the present Supreme Court, indicated a concern about the scope of such programs rather different than the objections voiced today. The major race-conscious Reconstruction programs were deliberately aimed at equipping blacks to meet their own economic and other needs. Most of the assistance provided to blacks by the Freedmen's Bureau was in the form of farm land or education, 225 and the congressional proponents of the Bureau stressed that its work would enable the freedmen to become self-supporting. 226 But although these programs were deliberately limited to blacks, Congress provided food 'to all classes of destitute or helpless persons' 227 during the famine of 1867. Representative Bingham, both a supporter of the Freedmen's Bureau and the principal drafter of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, rejected arguments against extending the aid to white former rebels as well as to black former slaves, insisting that Congress should not 'discriminate . . . between friends and enemies when famishing men ask for bread.'
228
This history suggests that the fourteenth amendment limitations on affirmative action concern not the amount of any burden on whites or the precision with which black victims of past discrimination are identified, but the type of benefit bestowed by a program. The thirty-ninth Congress approved race-conscious programs designed to enable blacks to improve their situation and, although the programs were remedial in purpose, no attempt was made to screen individual black participants to assure that they were actual victims or to measure the degree of past disadvantage. That same Congress, however, rejected discrimination in programs providing food for the starving, insisting that when the government undertook to meet essential human needs it should make no distinctions on the basis of race or past loyalties. The federal government provided education only for freedmen, but it fed all who were hungry, black and white alike.
All of the affirmative acton programs considered by the Supreme Court in the last decade provided minorities with opportunities *797 for self-support and self-advancement in the form of education, 229 job training, 230 business opportunities, 231 or employment. 232 These programs were similar in content and purpose to the affirmative action measures of a century ago, and were considerably less restrictive than the 100 percent quotas enforced by the Freedmen's Bureau. Benign race-conscious measures related to voting 233 are also analogous to the nineteenth-century programs because they help minorities to advance their individual or collective political interests. A very different constitutional problem would arise if a state or the federal government were to adopt racial distinctions in programs providing for essential human needs, such as food or clothing. A program that provided food stamps only to blacks or that alloted blacks more food stamps than whites would certainly be unconstitutional. Justice Powell's opinion in Fullilove suggests that such a distinction might be permissible if it represented only a portion of the overall program. Alternatively, Justice Stevens' Fullilove opinion suggests affirmative action in food stamps would be possible if all the black participants were shown to have been actual victims of discrimination. But the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment indicates that its framers would not have regarded either limitation as sufficient to justify racial distinctions among families in need of food. Of course, even in dealing with necessities race-conscious action would remain constitutional if needed to assure fairness within the program; if all blacks are denied food stamps in June, they could be given a double allocation in July.
The line between programs providing basic necessities and programs providing opportunities for self-advancement and selfsupport will not always be clear. Nevertheless, virtually every affirmative action program adopted in our generation falls clearly within the second category. The vast majority of current programs concern education and jobs, the two major areas addressed by the race-conscious Reconstruction programs. This similarity suggests that public officials today have a sense of when benign racial distinctions *798 are appropriate that is quite faithful to the views that prevailed in Congress 120 years ago. Consequently, the Court's role in enforcing the constitutional limitations on affirmative action should remain minor.
The last two decades of debate regarding affirmative action have produced a great flowering of social and philosophical theories about race, equality, and social justice. 
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Kalbfleisch asked: If Congress possesses the power to provide in this manner for these emancipated slaves, where, let me ask, is the power to end? Is it confined to freedmen of African descent, or can Congress legislate to provide as well for the unfortunate whites and the remnant of colored people to be found in the free States? If so, it requires but little sagacity to foretell what results might be caused in consequence of allowing this bill to become the entering wedge to a system of legislation which could not be other than deplorable in its effects upon our social condition. Id . at 761; see also id. at 763 (statement of Rep. Brooks) ('Do not abandon this beautiful theory of States, and convert this government into a consolidation and centralization, solely for the money-making purposes of this bill.').
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Stewart stated: I have also sympathy for the widows and orphans of the North that have been bereaved by this terrible contest, who are forgotten in our efforts for the negro. I have sympathy for the poor negro who is left in a destitute and helpless condition. I am anxious to enter upon any practical legislation that shall help all classes and all sufferers, without regard to color-the white as well as the black. Id 
